Global Voices, generative media structures.. and the end of nationalism?

Photo by Neha Viswanathan: A small subset of the Global Voices bloggers who met in Budapest.

(Apologies in advance for the length of this post. I've decided to subject my readers to this even-longer-than-usual "brain dump" because at least a few people out there are interested in some of the ideas related to global participatory media, and I'd like feed back on some of the outstanding questions faced by Global Voices.)

At the end of last week's Global Voices Summit, one of our Middle Eastern bloggers came up to me and said: "nationalism is dead for me now." He said that ten years ago he was a strong nationalist. Being a blogger and debating issues with other people online over the past few years has greatly weakened that feeling. Now after four days hanging out with bloggers from all over the world, nationalism makes no sense to him any more.

(For full accounts of the summit, see David Sasaki's excellent overview, Ethan Z's great series of posts,  our media digest, the summit blog, technorati, google blog search, Rezwan's excellent roundup of summit bloggers, etc.)

The blogger's rejection of nationalism (I'm not going to name him because he is sensitive about how he has been portrayed in the past), and the role GV seems to have played in his change of thinking, brings me to Joi Ito's post-summit blog post. Joi is now on the GV Board and has been involved since the very beginning - when it was just a meeting of bloggers. He writes:

Global Voices is a super-important part in fixing what I call the "caring problem". There is a systemic bias against reporting international news in most developed nations. When pressed, many editors will say that people just don't want to read articles about other parts of the world. This is because most people don't care. They don't care because they don't hear the voices or know people in other countries. I think that by providing voices to all over the world, we have the ability to connect people and get people to care more.

I also believe that voice is probably more important than votes or guns. I believe that combating extremism is most effectively done by winning the argument in public, not by censorship, elections or destruction. I believe that providing everyone with a voice to participate in the global dialog is key. The ability to communication and connect without permission or fear of retribution is a pillar of open society in the 21st Century. Global Voices is the best example of this that I know of.

Patrick Philippe Meier, a self-described GV "outsider" and doctoral research fellow at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative had this conclusion:

...The Internet, and the information society, the global network of social nodes and connections, is becoming more complex. This complexity adds to diversity and balance. Most people, most of the time, in most places are nonviolent. Social extremes are by definition minorities. Global Voices are more informed and moderate. Giving a voice to these Global Voices online is likely to diminish the impact of extremists. How do we find these voices in the symphony of the superhighway? We need to make quanta of information more indexable and more searchable. Tag, tag, tag away. Only then will locality, diversity, opportunity be made more visible....

So how did we get to the point that people are saying such things about GV - things we never imagined when we started the project - and where might we go from here? As this article that I wrote jointly with Ethan Zuckerman back in 2006 tries to explain, GV arose as an attempt to address badly skewed global information flows in which the voices of people from North America and Western Europe are disproportionately amplified in the global media. But now here's the problem: the skewed flows aren't just happening on a global scale, there are imbalances within countries, regions, and communities. So the question is: what is the best way to achieve a global media environment where everybody has the ability to speak and be heard? And is there also a way for people to find authenticity, relevance, and quality amidst the cacophony of cat-blogging and hidden agendas?

By having a tiered system of expert blogger-editors and translators who curate what they find to be globally relevant and authentic from their regions, we've made a decent but imperfect stab at the second question, although I think we need to revisit our systems in the future and find ways to improve them, funds and people permitting. This year's discussions in Budapest focused largely on the first question: equity of "voice" within national borders as well as across borders.  At several points during both the public conference and the internal community meetings, people talked about the importance of amplifying minority, non-elite, disadvantaged and dissenting voices alongside "representative" or "typical" voices from various countries. Simultaneously, there's also the problem of "silent majorities" who tend to spend less time seeking media interviews, demonstrating in public, and doing things that headlines than people who tend to be on the more atypical extremes of any given country's political spectrum. These attention deficits lead not only to imbalance in media coverage, but also create social pressures that lead to self-censorship: people think, think "why should I stick my neck out and risk getting in trouble for an issue few people in my country really care about or agree with?"

It's not just mainstream media that presents a skewed and un-representative picture to the world; it turns out that blogospheres, at least as they have naturally evolved so far, are amplifiers for the voices and views of educated, wired elites. As David Sasaki, who runs Rising Voices, Global Voices' outreach arm, writes: "As incredibly diverse as the global blogosphere is, the 'blogger demographic' tends to [be] very homogenous. From Tanzania to Tasmania, most bloggers live in the wealthy neighborhoods of urban centers, most are well educated, and most belong to the majority groups of their countries."

Whose voice - and whose life - gets to represent a particular nationality, ethnic group, or community, is a problem that both Ethan Z, who co-founded GV with me, and web philosopher David Weinberger have been writing about over the past few days. Media reporting about any given issue tends to rely on a few colorful examples, chosen for their interestingness, the willingness of the subjects to talk to the media, and their ability to speak articulately Weinberger points out that extrapolating reality from a few examples  results in what he calls "The Fallacy of Examples."

As Ethan points out, "it’s lots easier to write about extreme examples rather than median ones." He cites Clay Shirky's excellent new book, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations - which I happened to read on the plane en route to Budapest. Shirky analyzes the way in which online communities tend to follow a "power law." Ethan describes the phenomenon: "If you attempt to generalize about the group as a whole from the most prolific participants, you’re going to misunderstand what’s going on."

There are many factors contributing to who gets to the top of the power curve, starting with who even tries to speak, who succeeds in speaking, and who is silenced.  The digital divide - access to affordable internet and mobile communications - is only one small part of it. Many people are so accustomed to being ignored, it doesn't occur to them that creating their own media would produce any useful result. They worry about bringing trouble on their families by calling socially unacceptable attention to themselves. In Budapest, we agreed that Global Voices has an important role to play - and some believe a responsibility -  in supporting people who have stories to tell but who are isolated for various reasons. When local authority figures (or their parents and spouses) discourage them from speaking, they can be encouraged by the fact that people around the world are indeed linking to them - and that if something happens to them, questions will be asked.

Censorship and threat of imprisonment also skew the conversation: if certain kinds of views are silenced - or driven to quiet largely-unnoticed pockets of their online communities - then it becomes hard to tell whether the loudest and most predominant voices really represent the majority view of a particular community if the censorship and threat of retribution had not been imposed on its people. There was some discussion in Budapest about to what extent our regional editors and bloggers who represent certain countries have an obligation to amplify "representative" or "mainstream" views and to what extent they should be amplifying minority and "dissident" voices. It's a tough balancing act, and no matter what you do, you get criticized by people who think you're misrepresenting their country or community.

Perhaps the biggest unresolved problem on Global Voices is how to be truly fair to everybody - to minorities as well as majorities, while not appearing to take sides in various people's independence struggles. Now here's the background: Our editorial structure is based Wikipedia's list of countries - a list maintained by a very active community who fight fiercely about any addition or subtraction. It generally serves us well - or better than any of the alternatives seemed likely to do - but it's impossible to please everybody, and there are people who regularly trash GV for this choice. Our ideal goal (far from being realized) is to have a contributor from all of those countries except North America and Western Europe. This stems from a decision at the beginning that if we started out including those two regions, GV could get dominated by those bloggers who have other global platforms anyway. Our priority was to create a platform for people who have a harder time getting their voices heard. At any rate, the countries that we do cover are then divided up into regions, each managed by a "regional editor". We also have a number of language editors who post summaries and excerpts of translated content from non-English blogs into English on the main site. What languages we translate onto the main site is primarily a function of funding and volunteer interest. (Meanwhile, as Ethan described in this post, a family of websites have sprung up on which volunteers translate GV's English content into various languages.)

One of the questions debated most heatedly in Budapest (though politely and respectfully after several days of eating and drinking together and sharing hotel rooms) was this: Should GV include blogs from North America and Western Europe, especially those from minority communities whose voices are not well heard in their own national medias let alone the global media? Does it make sense to be covering Macedonia but not Greece? And the corollaries: Does our system of organizing the world - and thus people's identities - largely according to their U.N.-recognized nationality help or hinder the idea that people from anywhere on the planet should be able to have a voice and be heard? But if we don't organize ourselves according to the nation-state framework, and on top of that a regional hierarchy of editors, how do we organize our website without descending into chaos - or turning into a platform for the world's independence groups? On the other hand, there have been strong disagreements in the past year or so amongst contributors and editors over whether we should have separate categories and/or contributors for "Tibet" and "Chechnya" (to give just two examples of many others) - and if by failing to do so we are failing to adequately represent online voices from those places, and thus in effect discriminating against those minorities? It was fascinating to see who came down on what side of these questions - and it was not split along regional, ethnic, or socio-economic lines at all, people from all continents came down on both sides of these questions, to varying degrees. One observer of our community who I spoke to after the meeting suggested creating a "shadow" or "parallel" website in which we try organizing ourselves according to some other criteria than nation-state and see what happens. It's an interesting idea. I'd be interested in hearing more ideas and opinions from readers of GV as well as contributors and community members. Can GV come up with an innovative and equitable way to organize a global citizen media website without using the nation-state as its organizing principle?

...which brings me back to Shirky's book. Another point he makes which I agree with is that "communications tools don't get socially interesting until they get technologically boring."  Activities like blogging, podcasting, and uploading videos to YouTube-like websites are no longer considered technically innovative by the Silicon Valley set. But these tools are only just starting to be used by indigenous Bolivians, barrio kids in Medelin, Colombia, young people in Madagascar, kids in Kolkata's red light district,  etc. Only after digital citizen media tools become commonplace in such communities will the most interesting social innovation really start to happen on a global scale. What excites me is that people who work on Global Voices are perhaps uniquely positioned to understand what's going on - as well as play a part in it. One thing that's clear from the GV experience so far is that people have multiple identities: many bloggers chafe at being pigeonholed in accordance with one accident of birth above all others. At the same time, others - especially bloggers from countries that gained independence in the past decade or so - are extremely proud of their national identity and proud to have the opportunity to promote that identity on a site like GV. Others come from minority groups seeking independence. How best to build a collaborative citizen media community among people who define their identities -  and identities of others - very differently? What - beyond an interesting website - might result from such an attempt? Is it possible to build a global citizen media community with a post-nationalist identity?

Shirky also talks about how systems of collaborative production - like Wikipedia, for example - are not organizationally flat. A very small percentage of Wikipedians do the bulk of the work. There are also community "enforcement" systems in place in order to prevent this open platform from being completely destroyed and overrun by a few ill-intentioned individuals. At the same time, these systems and structures - "rules" if you like - were not driven by a central management team in the way that the president and publisher of a news organization would decide (largely top-down, in my experience) and enforce (journalists' fear of being fired or laid off in the next round of cutbacks) how things should be run and what the editorial policies should be. If you ask Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales whether he had a plan for "solving" the many problems of vandalism and self-promotion Wikipedia faces, he says he didn't - the core community of Wikipedia's most passionate and active volunteers came up with solutions and developed the "management" and "enforcement" structures around them. Likewise, I'm quite positive that Ethan, myself, and GV's core management team are not going to come up with answers and solutions to the questions and problems I brought up in the previous paragraph. The solutions are going to have to be generated by the community, somehow, if enough of them even want to solve these problems or can achieve some sort of consensus. Who knows if that will ever be possible.

...which brings me to another book:  Jonathan Zittrain's The Future of the Internet, And How to Stop It. JZ (as he is known at the Berkman Center) is concerned about the Internet's potential loss of "generativity:" the ability of PC users at the edges of the Internet to innovate - develop software applications and all kinds of media platforms - without coordinating with some central authority, whether it be a computer or device manufacturer or whoever controls the Internet connections between devices. Increasingly, people are connecting to the Internet with what he calls "tethered devices" that are not generative: they don't allow the user to create new applications or media without working directly with the manufacturer, or at very least using the manufacturers designated and/or proprietary systems. A PC is generative while iPods, TiVo's, Wii's, etc., are not. There are some good reasons - security and user simplicity primarily - why these devices are tethered, not generative. But Zittrain warns that as the Internet becomes less and less generative, innovation and freedom of speech will suffer.

Reading the book on my way back from the GV summit I wondered:  if the Internet becomes less generative just as growing numbers of people in the developing world are connecting to it, what does that mean? Will indigenous people in Bolivia and teenagers in Malawi be deprived of the chance to shape the future of global communications to the same extent that college kids in California and Finland were able to do? If this is a real concern (which I think it is, the more I think about it), what do we do to make sure that generativity is preserved in the next generation of Internet-connected devices (largely mobile phones and set-top boxes, most likely)? At least for enough of those devices that people in the developing world will have the chance to innovate and shape communications technologies to their own community needs to the extent that Westerners have shaped technology to theirs?

Zittrain also talked a bit about generativity as an organizing principle, with Wikipedia once again as the prime example. This got me thinking about Global Voices and the extent to which GV is also a generative organization. Traditional news organizations are non-generative for the most part: changes in the way things are done generally are not due to initiative taken by reporters in far-flung bureaus: you can suggest changes but the policy decisions have to be made at the center then implemented downward - and substantial reforms happen very slowly, usually with great organizational resistance. GV is I think probably less generative than Wikipedia the way it's currently run, but still a lot more generative than a traditional news organization. Rising Voices, Global Voices Advocacy, and especially Lingua all arose from activities that bloggers in our networks saw the need for and were taking it upon themselves to do, long before GV created formal platforms for these activities. Since we are a largely volunteer-driven organization with only a couple full-time staffers, a couple dozen part-timers who are really working for love more than money and a couple hundred volunteers, we can't make any major policy decision about structure or funding without first gaining consensus from the community.  One might argue that this slows down executive decision-making, but on the other hand, if our community doesn't agree with a decision they'll stop contributing and GV will cease to exist anyway - like Wikipedia our volunteers are not tied to us by salary and employment contracts. But is GV generative enough? Are we enabling enough innovation at the edges and are we enabling new ideas that come from far-flung volunteers to get support and be implemented if the community agrees that they're worth implementing? I don't know the answer. I hope some of our editors and volunteers will let me know what they think.

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Footnote: To be clear, I take zero credit for the success of the Budapest summit, as I had very little to do with the planning other than a bit of fundraising and a bit of brainstorming early on. Most of the credit goes to Georgia Popplewell, Sami Ben Gharbia, Solana Larsen, and David Sasaki, not only for the awe-inspiring public program, and an advocacy workshop before the public summit, but also for two days of "internal" brainstorming meetings for people who contribute directly to the various GV projects. The meetings were so energetic that even cynics lost some of their cynicism. But the real magic came from all of our community members, just by being there and being themselves. It's not hard to have a great meeting when you bring together some of the most articulate people from around the planet who are generally not on the conference circuit, and thus have new things to say and brand new perspectives that you've never heard before!

Comments

[Jillian York]

Wonderful summation, Rebecca. I particularly loved this quote:

One thing that's clear from the GV experience so far is that people have multiple identities: many bloggers chafe at being pigeonholed in accordance with one accident of birth above all others.

[Alice B.]

Thanks for this, Rebecca. This is a nice big picture snapshot. Very helpful for someone who wasn't there in person. Lots of work ahead.

[Doug]

You wrote: "Will indigenous people in Bolivia and teenagers in Malawi be deprived of the chance to shape the future of global communications to the same extent that college kids in California and Finland were able to do?"

As those communities are introduced to new technology, they become a different iteration of themselves, so it is hard to say just how a community now would be affected later.

That is, if we argue that technology is meant to foster change. Is it poor thinking to establish that I believe technology is meant to move people from archaic beliefs to more profound (relatively so) beliefs that are different than those generated in that people's current cultural framework?

[Portnoy]

Thank you Rebecca, your post is thorough and very readable. I am trying to write an article for Media Watch in Taiwan, and I will use some of your words.

[Twofish]

Different people react to the internet in different ways, and one mistake is to take one person's experiences and generalize them across all people.

It's interesting since the internet has made me much more of a nationalist than I otherwise would have been. A nationalist that tries to be tolerant, open-minded and cosmopolitan, but a nationalist nevertheless. Accidents of birth put me of three potentially conflicting nationalisms, that of the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of China. But the internet has allowed me to integrate those different nationalisms, and I'm actually much more emotional about the US, the PRC, and the ROC than I would be without the internet.

As far as what nationalism means to me. With the internet you realize how large the world is, and that there are millions of issues and millions of different groups of people that you could care about. You don't have time to care about everyone and everything, so you have to choose. What being nationalistic means to me is to say I care about these people and these issues.

[Twofish]

One thing that I think is true in the current world is that "one size fits all" just will not work, so I think trying to come up with a general structure that fits all situations is pointless.

Part of the reason you *need* different voices is that situation A is going to be different than situation B, and to understand what is going on you need people with deep knowledge of a particular situation.

This is one reason that the concept of journalism as opinion leaders and shapers needs to be rethought since pretty much everyone knows something to much greater detail than the Washington press corps.

As far as my own experience...

The great nightmare that I have is that the various nationalisms that are part of my identity will turn out to conflict irreconcilably, and this could happen if the PRC and the US get into a war over Taiwan. I used to be quite annoyed that I was in this situation, but then I realized that if the US and the PRC did get into a war over Taiwan, I wouldn't be the only one who would be looking at a disaster, and being where I am, I do have some rather deep knowledge of the political systems of Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, which I can use to be a small part in making sure that things don't blow up.

Also in talking to people you learn a lot of unexpected things. For example, I've learned a lot about what it means to be "Chinese" from the Czechs, the Irish, and the Syrians. Studying and thinking about Syrian nationalists helps me much better understand Chinese nationalism since I can look at Syria with much more detachment and less emotion than I can looking at China.

One of the interesting ironies is that one of the people who I think of as being a "model Chinese person" happened to be my Latin teacher who was a traditionalist Catholic from North Carolina and was as far as I know, not ethnically Chinese at all. The reason I think of that person as the model Chinese is that he embodied what "being Chinese" means to me, even though he didn't have brown eyes or black hair.

Studying history in college, I learned that this wasn't a coincidence. The Manchu emperors had a problem of getting people to see themselves as "Chinese" even though ethnically they were very different. The way they did that was to define "Chinese" in terms of scholarship and academic advancement and to deemphasize race and ethnicity. The Manchu agenda of being accepted as Chinese also fit in with the agendas of Catholic missionaries like Matteo Ricci, who were as far as I am concerned also quite Chinese. What ended up happening was that there was an idea, a passion that got transmitted through my Latin teacher's teachers and my parent's teachers.

I didn't realize it (and neither did he) but when I was in high school Latin reading Caesar and learning about the history of the Roman Republic, but my Latin teacher and I were part of a conversation about "being Chinese" that has been going on for a very, very long time.

Nationalism works in some odd ways.

[Rebecca MacKinnon]

Really good points you raise Twofish. You're absolutely right about the fallacy of generalizing, and right to point out that the way the internet influences a person's nationalism may be very different depending on a person.

As you say in your great second comment, it's also true that nationalism has different flavors: it can be inclusive or can be racist - and that the Chinese sense of what it means to be "Chinese" has not always been as ethnically exclusive as it generally seems to be at this point in history. An old friend of mine in Beijing used to point out that what made China great in its heyday was the ability of Chinese culture to accept all kinds of outsiders and ethnic groups as long as they agreed to conduct their lives a certain way - and that the multicultural makeup of Chinese culture had not adequately been taught in Chinese schools.
To go back to the first point, I guess I am not a determinist or fatalist in that I believe the impact of technology and media on the future of human society is not pre-determined: how things play out will depend on the choices and actions of many individuals and many groups. So I believe in being pro-active. I am hopeful that if we believe that having a democratic (small "d") conversation amongst all the world's people is a good thing for the human race in general, and if we do something proactive to facilitate such a conversation, we will increase the chances that more people's experiences of nationalism - if they retain it or find it strengthened- will be of the inclusive and tolerant variety, as opposed to the ethno-centric and/or confrontational variety.

[Twofish]

The notion of "Chinese" as a national identity originated in the 19th century like pretty much all national identities. Once you have a nationalistic notion of "Chinese" its possible to look at history through that point of view, and to start creating educational bureaucracies that reinforce the idea of nationhood.

One of the interesting things about looking at someone else's nationalism is that you figure out how weird their history books looks to you, and if you think for a moment, you figure out how weird your history books must look to them.

A lot of the contradictions in the notion of Chinese was shaped come from different groups in the 19th and 20th century that were trying to define the term to advance their political objectives. You had the Manchus that were a small minority group trying to create a national identity that included themselves and all of the peoples of the lands which they ruled, and the Ming loyalists, then the Taiping and then Nationalist revolutionaries that were trying to create a national identity that excluded the Manchus.

What the Manchus in the 19th century did was to appear to be different things to the different groups that they ruled. To Han Chinese, they portrayed themselves as patrons of Confucian classical learning, and used the Imperial examinations to create a class of bureaucrats who were loyal to the Emperor. It's this group of people that were my intellectual ancestors, and one of the interesting things is how these notions of how the world should work carried over to elite college admissions in the United States.

I should also point out that the notion of Chinese that came out of this is not particularly ethnically exclusive. One can see this by the passionate insistence that a lot of people from the PRC have that Tibetans and Uighurs are Chinese, even though they are very distinct ethnically, culturally, and linguistically from the majority Han. And within Han Chinese you have lots of differences.

In fact, one of the annoyances of Chinese nationalists like myself is the fact that people in the West often insist that nation-states be ethnically homogenous and oppose efforts to create a national identity out of people that just don't look like each other.

I get very nervous around people that advocate "narrow" and "clear" definitions of national identity since my status is very unclear and "narrow" definitions of what it means to be Chinese or American put me at grave risk of being an outsider or worse yet, a traitor.

[medea]

Is there really a need for an alternate GV arranged by topics, or is this just a natural progression where we will begin tagging articles not by a country but choosing instead to tag them as a topic. Most of the times, we blog about events that are not exactly "regional", they could've happened anywhere, not specifically in that area, and we've gotten used to tagging them as a country first and foremost.

I think the change is in us. Or that's the conclusion we reached when discussing covering the topics of culture, literature, sexuality, etc... just tag things better, be broader in the topics covered and eventually the "country" aspect will become extra information, and not one that defines the post.

[Ivan]

Nice post Rebecca.

Multiple identities - good language for that is 'polymorphy;' it's especially interesting in severely restricted environments, where a second identity exists outside the public sphere, for instance Pakistani or Iranian women with travel, work, and association restrictions imposed on them by their families.

Two thought experiments for how GV would look without the nation-state structure:

I'm a big proponent of a borderless world. It would be really fascinating to set up the borderless world shadow site, to see whether and how participants choose to align themselves. Of course, we'd take all sorts of baggage along, but would something else also emerge?

Alternatively, the polymorphy approach; is there some way to exploit that notion to allow for multiple characterizations of a given place, issue, subject? User customization? Tags, obviously. What other tools could encourage or make evident polymorphy? It's the same challenge we face with serendipity - engineering randomness into our directed searches on the web.

[Han solo]

To Twofish,(refer to : Twofish
| July 08, 2008 at 10:54 PM )
Quote "The Manchu emperors had a problem of getting people to see themselves as "Chinese" even though ethnically they were very different. The way they did that was to define "Chinese" in terms of scholarship and academic advancement and to deemphasize race and ethnicity. The Manchu agenda of being accepted as Chinese also fit in with the agendas of Catholic missionaries like Matteo Ricci "

Matteo Ricci, (1552-1610),was one of the greatest western missionary that ever came to China(Ming Dynasty).He introduced Christianity,astronomy,mathematic,geography,and various modern science into Ming;at the same time,he was the first ever western scholar who could master Chinese Classical Language (Wenyan),then later on he translated the Confucian classics into Latin, with assistance from the scholar Xu Guangqi.
During Manchu Dynasty (1636-1912),all those barbaric emperors were busy burning books,putting Han scholars in jail,and murdering folks.
Mr.Twofish,either you have forgotten your Chinese history lessons,or you had read the wrong text books.

[Han solo]

To Twofish again,
Quote"What the Manchus in the 19th century did was to appear to be different things to the different groups that they ruled. To Han Chinese, they portrayed themselves as patrons of Confucian classical learning."
Mr.Twofish,you are really very ignorant of Manchu history and Confucius teaching.
满清入关以后，满清皇帝虽然礼遇传教士，鼓励对西欧输出儒学，但是却禁止本国人民了解西方文明。
After Manchus stepped onto the southern part of the Great Wall,even though the Manchu Emperor treated the western missionary with respect,encouraged the export of Confucius Teaching into western Europe,but in turn prohibited her own civilians to understand western culture.

这不仅仅是因为满清皇帝意识到了西方文明对自己皇权的威胁，更重要的是满清的皇权因为有旗人军事和官僚集团支撑，能够通过无限扩大到民间的文字狱，将社会舆论的引导权从文人手中夺到自己的手里，由此皇权就有能力阻止中国向西方学习和平等地交流，使华夏文明只输出不输入。
Manchu Emperors realized that western culture is a threat to it's imperial authority,but most importantly,the Manchu imperial authority had the protection and support from Manchu Flag military and bureaucrat,so that the Emperors were able to impose "word prison" into every corner of the society,resulting in the inability of the society's intellectuals to form or conduct public opinions,that means only the emperors can "create" public opinions,thus the imperial authority was able to stop CHINA 's learning from the WEST,and exchanging with the west on even ground,the end result being Chung Hua culture could only export but no import.

西方文明本来是和华夏文明互补和平等的，西方文明需要华夏文明的平等和仁爱来反抗他们的等级压迫；华夏文明需要西方文明的公民意识和宗教来对反抗我们的王神和一的皇权。
Originally,western culture and Chung Hua culture were on even par and enriching each other.Equality,humanity and charity,all these qualities from Chung Hua culture,were absorbed into the western culture to counteract their own class suppression;whereas westerner's religion,and it's wareness of citizen's obligations ,were needed by Chung Hua culture to counteract our own" God-King" imperial authority.

西方文明通过和华夏文明交流实现了自己的现代化，可是华夏文明中的人文精神却被满清扼杀了，并且还全面阻止了华夏文明向西方学习。这使华夏文明丧失了通过与西方交流，实现自身升级现代化的机会，满清不仅导致了中国在近代的全面落后，而且还阻碍了西方文明和华夏文明的全面融合。

Through the exchange with Chung Hua culture,the western culture was finally modernized,but Manchu imperial authority,not satisfied with strangling our spirit of humanity,went on to impose a complete stop on the Chung Hua culture's learning from the west.The opportunity to be upgraded and modernized,through the exchange with western culture,was lost.The Manchu Dynasty,not only was the cause of the full-scale backward of China in the modern time,also impeded the full integrating of western and Chung Hua culture.

下面我们就来说说满清的无限扩大到民间的文字狱的效果。

由于文字狱扩大到了民间文人，使民间独立修史成为不可能，这就使满清皇帝能够将社会舆论权夺到自己手中，满清皇帝们便可以放心大胆地胡编乱造了。之所以满清皇帝可以搞长达150年的扩大到民间的文字狱，是因为他们有绝对依附于他的旗人军事和官僚集团。

The end results of the unlimited expansion of "word prison"into the the civilian society by the Manchu.
Because "word prison"was expanded into the civilian intellectuals,the society's independent recording of history has become impossible,thus the Manchu Emperors were able to control the public voice,and boldly said and wrote whatever they like.Why was Manchu emperors were able to make this "word prison"to last 150 years(Manchu Dynasty lasted 260 plus years),the reason being they had the complete support of the Manchu military and the bloc of Manchu bureaucrat .

普通汉族王朝的皇帝的统治需要依靠官员，而汉族王朝的官员的来源是什么呢？就是来自于民间的文人。所以汉族王朝的皇帝一方面依靠自己的“天子”身份（神权背景）压制文人，但另一方面却不得不依靠这些文人。所以，明朝的文字狱只搞了30年就不敢干了，而且还不敢杀民间的文人。明朝皇帝如果真的杀光了有社会责任感的文人，谁来帮他管理国家呢？

The ruling of emperors of Han ethnic required bureaucrat,which in turn came from the society's intellectuals.The fact that the emperors of Han ethnic were "son of heaven",and this God-given-authority was used to suppress and control the intellectuals,on the other hand,the emperors depended on these intellectuals.That was why,the Ming dynasty's "word prison" only lasted for 30 years, not only Ming dynasty dared not continue the "word prison",they dared not murder the intellectuals.If all the intellectuals with a social responsive heart,were killed by the Ming emperors,there would be no one left to manage and run the country.

满清则不同，它所依靠的是旗人军事和官僚集团，不是来自于民间的文人官僚集团。旗人还掌握绝对的军事权力，一方面他手上有足够的暴力（旗人军事集团）可以搞无限扩大到民间的文字狱；另一方面他也不需要依靠汉族文人官僚集团治国（依靠旗人官僚集团），杀光了汉族有社会责任感的文人也不会动摇他们的统治，反而使他们的统治更巩固。这样，他就可以对全社会的知识分子大开杀戒了。
Manchu dynasty was different,it relied on the Manchurian military and manchurian bureaucrat bloc.Manchurian commanded absolute military power,on one hand they were able to impose "word prison" onto the society,backed up by ample violence;on the other hand, bureaucrat of Han ethnic were not needed to manage the country,to kill off all the Han intellectuals with a social responsive heart,would not harm their ruling,on the contrary,would only strengthen their ruling.This way,they could kill any of the intellectuals of the society at will.

从中明开始的思想解放和与西方的交流无疑对皇权是极大的挑战，满清皇帝们个个精明强干，对此认识很深，绝对依附于皇权的旗人军事和官僚集团使他们有能力扼杀思想解放和禁绝于西方交流。

The liberal thinking of the intellectuals of middle Ming dynasty and the resulting cultural exchange with the west,pose a huge challenge towards the imperial authority,the shrewd and powerful emperors knew it all along,they could stop the liberal thinking and at the same time, prohibit the cultural exchange with the west.

明朝的文字狱和满清文字狱对社会的影响截然相反。

明朝的文字狱非但没有让文人们甘心当皇权的奴才，反而造成了文人和官僚与皇权的对立情绪，这为中明以后的思想解放和“非君”打下了伏笔。也正是因为明朝的文人们看到了传统华夏文明中的弊病在于王神合一的皇权，才会有人提出“天子失官，学在西夷”。

Though both Ming and Manchu dynasty had "word prison",but it's effect on the society was absolutely opposite.
Not only the Ming's intellectuals did not willingly become the emperor's minions, on the contrary,the intellectuals and bureaucrat were taking up position to oppose the imperial authority,resulting in the liberal thinking and the "say no to the emperor" movement during Middle Ming.Ming's intellectuals knew that the "God-King" imperial authority was the root of the short-coming of traditional Chung Hua civilization,resulting in the advocating of "When emperor lost the support of the bureaucrat,we have to learn from the West"
满清的文字狱做到了让文人们甘心当皇权的奴才，使整个社会死气沉沉。被外国人暴打了一顿以后，一句“放眼看世界”居然能被封为思想家。殊不知300年明朝的文人们早就放眼看世界了，不但放眼看世界，还要主动向世界学习，所谓“天子失官，学在西夷”。

The Manchu "word prison" had achieved it's goal,turning intellectuals into minions of imperial authority,the whole society was enveloped in the smell of death.Foreigners came and gave him a good bash,only one phrase "open eyes to look at the world",was enough to be crowned as master of thought.Long time ago,during Ming dynasty,intellectuals have been "looking at the world",not only that,they had actively learned from the world,meaning "If the emperor has lost the support of the bureaucrat,he should learn from the western people.

明朝的文字狱对中国社会思想和文化的发展相当于疫苗的作用，肌体暂时有些不适反应，但接下来的却是对毒素的顽强的抵抗力。满清的文字狱对中国社会思想和文化的发展相当于病毒的作用，让华夏社会的思想和文化彻底走向畸形了。大家知道疫苗就是毒性大大减弱的病毒，两者在质上是相同的，区别在于毒性这个量上，可是它们对于一个正常人的肌体的作用却是截然相反的。

To China's social thinking and the development of culture,the Ming's "word prison" acted as a vaccine,the body may have some uneasy reactions,but a strong and persistent reaction against the virus is kicking in.Whereas the Manchu "word prison"acted as a virus,and completely deformed Chung Hua's social thinking and culture.We all know that vaccine is actually weak form of virus,basically they are the same,the difference is in the degree of virulence,yet causing opposite results on a normal body.

两朝文字狱对社会的不同作用，更体现在对华夏文明中人文精神的扼杀上。

The different effects by the "word prison"of Ming and Manchu ,is more profoundly shown on the strangling of the spirit of humanity of Chung Hua culture.

什么叫人文精神？就是人不同于动物的文明精神。动物学家D.莫利斯的《裸猿》发表以后震惊全世界。几乎所有社会性动物都绝对地屈服于本群体中强者和暴力。比如，弱的猿猴会时刻强烈地表达对强的猿猴的从属和依附关系，比如在强的猿猴面前匍匐在地，主动撅起屁股让强的猿猴鸡奸（雄性），由此它们可以活的好一些。

What is the spirit of humanity?It's the cultural spirit that make us different from animals.The publication of the book "Naked Ape",by zoologist D.Morris,shook the world.Nearly all the social animals will absolutely submit to own group's strongest and most powerful and violent.For example,the weaker monkeys will clearly and openly express it's dependency and belonging towards the stronger monkeys,for example,go down low on the ground on all four,stick up the bum high enough in the air to be raped by stronger monkeys (by the anus),so that they can live a better life.

而这些和人类社会的等级制度殊途同归，尤其是和满人的主奴依附关系有着异曲同工之妙。所以动物学家D.莫利斯认为人类不过是没有长毛的猿猴——裸猿。西方现代文明产生不过300多年，但人类从此摆脱了弱者对强者的强烈的从属和依附，摆脱了对暴力的崇拜和恐惧。因此，所谓人文精神就是人类群体中的大多数不惧怕暴力的威胁和平等地看待弱者的文明精神。

This socio-biological theories of rape,is similar to human society's class system,especially readily comparable to the Manchu master-slave relationship.That is why zoologist D.Morris reckoned that human is in fact monkeys and apes with no hair---Naked Apes.Modern western civilization ,is about 300 years old,but human had since shook off the deep belonging and dependency of the weak towards the strong,shook off the worship and fear towards violence. For this reason,so called spirit of humanity ,means that majority of human,not afraid of the threat of violence anymore,and had since treat weaker fellow human with equality.

明朝皇帝对大臣的暴行不是奴性，是权势和暴力。相对于皇帝们的权势和暴力，文人们能够前赴后继不向这种暴力和权势屈服就是我们华夏文明的人文精神，更重要的是这种不向皇权暴力屈服的人文精神在明代是被社会认可的，所以才会有那么多的文人前赴后继。除了不惧怕暴力的威胁，平等的看待社会中弱者也是一个重要的方面。在这个方面，传统华夏文明做得不好，但还是有对弱者施以仁爱的方面。

可是到了满清呢？满人们对主子们的依附和献媚，汉人当奴才而不得，更为严重的是整个社会以当奴才为荣（争相入旗），所有文人全都成了皇权暴力下的狗奴才。也就是汉文明中不向强权和暴力屈服的人文精神彻底没有了。保留的都是对“圣君”的歌颂、对暴力的恐惧、对自己同胞的冷漠，原有的汉族知识分子的“为天地立心，为生民立命，为往圣继绝学，为万世开太平”的社会责任感没有了，有的只是对统治者肉麻的吹捧。被保留和发展的这些不是人文精神而是裸猿的奴性！！！

In Manchu times,its people's dependence and ass-kissing towards the rulers,Han all tried their best to become 奴才= minion , much more serious was the fact the whole society glorify the becoming of minion(all try to turn into banner people)all the intellectuals transformed themself into doggy minions, 奴才 ,dogs,animal.The spirit of civility of Han culture,the option of saying NO to violence and ruthless authority was extinguished completely.What remained was only the praise towards the "sacred emperor",the fear of violence,the cold and indifference towards own race,"To establish heart of Sky and Earth,to look after the livelihood of common people,To continue the teaching of Confucius-Meng Zi,To bring about 10,000 generations of PEACE.",this kind of ideals have all gone up in smoke,what was left was the shameless and disgusting ass-kissing towards the rulers.What was preserved and developed is not the spirit of civility,but the animalistic of Naked Apes minionism.

传统汉文明不是现代文明，自然其中的人文精神和奴性兼而有之。汉文明发展自己的人文精神，淡化自己的奴性，需要引进西方文明的契约、法治观念。可是满清把汉文明中人文精神全部泯灭了，使原有的奴性恶性膨胀，同时禁绝了华夏和西方的文化交流。华夏不能与西方文明融合实现自身的现代化，并且自己的人文精神还退化了，由此中国在近代全面落后于西方也就成为了历史的必然。

The traditional Han civilization,different from modern civilization,is a mixture of spirit of humanity and minion philosophy.For the further development of Han civilization,and to reduce it's content of minion philosophy,it definitely needs to import" concepts of contract and rule by law"of the Western culture.The Manchu rulers had succeeded in the vanishing of Han's spirit of humanity,and viciously expanding of Han's minion philosophy,at the same time,the Manchu prohibit the interact of culture between Chung Hua and the west.Chung Hua civilization was prevented to merge with the west ,thus it's modernization was stopped,moreover,it's own spirit of humanity had degenerated.We have thus reached the historical conclusion: China's falling behind of the west is unpreventable.